How America’s Shale Strategy Is Powering a New Middle East Energy Boom

How America’s Shale Strategy Is Powering a New Middle East Energy Boom

How America’s Shale Strategy Is Powering a New Middle East Energy Boom

The highly focused development of the U.S.’s shale oil and gas sectors from the early 2010s transformed it from one of the world’s biggest importers of both into one of its leading exporters of both. But it did much more than this: it reversed the balance of energy power in the world from where it had been left at the end of the 1973 Oil Crisis. As forecasts for the demand for gas continue to surge on fears of further global conflicts and on the dramatic expansion of data centres around the globe, the Middle East is looking to expand its own gas production, particularly with a view to developing its own shale resources. The U.S., in this context, is seen by these countries – most notably Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – not as a future competitor but as a key knowledge resource, which is a status Washington is happy to adopt. After all, becoming an integral part of any country’s energy production on the ground is as good a way as any – and a lot better than most – to keep those relationships running to the U.S.’s best advantage.

It is interesting to note at this point the circularity of history here, albeit with a twist. Prior to 1973/74, the global oil industry had effectively been run by a small group of Western oil firms known as the ‘Seven Sisters’, as detailed in my latest book on the new global oil market order. These firms – comprised of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (which changed its name in 1935 to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and is now BP), Royal Dutch Shell, three iterations of Standard Oil (Standard Oil of California, Standard Oil of New Jersey, and Standard Oil Company of New York), Gulf Oil, and Texaco — were able to control oil exploration, development, transport and pricing for decades up to October 1973. At that point, OPEC members – led by Saudi Arabia — plus Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia, began an embargo on oil exports to the U.S., the U.K., Japan, Canada, and the Netherlands in response to their support for Israel in the Yom Kippur War. By the end of the resulting Crisis, in March 1974, the price of oil had risen from around US$3 per barrel (pb) to nearly US$11 pb before settling down for a while, before trending higher again. This, in turn, stoked the fire of a global economic slowdown, especially felt in the West. The then-Saudi Minister of Oil and Mineral Reserves, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, highlighted that the extremely negative effects on the West of the oil embargo marked a fundamental shift in the world balance of power between the developing nations that produced oil and the developed industrial nations that consumed it.

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